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POLICE VIOLENCE: CAUSES AND CURES,
EDWARD V. SPARER PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
FELLOWSHIP FORUM, BROOKLYN LAW
SCHOOL, APRIL 15, 1998
The following panel discussion, addressing the issue of police
violence in New York City, includes the comments of several
notable panelists who were kind enough to permit the Journal of
Law and Policy to publish their remarks.
The Editorial Board and Staff of the Journal have supplemented
the speakers' remarks with footnotes and commentary as a way of
providing background material for the speakers' statements. These
footnotes and commentaries by the Journal do not necessarily
represent the opinions of the speakers. Similarly, the opinions of
the noted speakers do not necessarily represent the opinion of the
Journal.
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Moderator
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Professor Paul G. Chevigny
Hon. Milton Mollen
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Dean Joan Wexler*
The topic of the Symposium this year is Police Violence: how
wide spread is the problem, what are its causes and is there a cure.
New York has had a police scandal every 20 years for the past 100
years. Investigative bodies were convened to study police corrup-
tion as far back as 1895 and then again in 1913, 1932 and 1955.'
I am sure you will recall the Knapp Commission, named for its
chair, Federal Judge Whitman Knapp, that was convened in 1972.2
It was before this commission that Frank Serpico, who was later
portrayed by Al Pacino, blew the whistle on corrupt cops.
3
. Dean, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., Yale University; M.A.T., Harvard
University; B.S., Cornell University.
The earliest commission on police violence in New York City was the
1894 Lexow Commission, a special committee appointed to investigate the Police
Department of the City of New York ("NYPD"). See I NEW YORK CITY POLICE
CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONS, 1894-1994 xliii-xlvi (Gabriel J. Chin
ed., 1997) (providing an overview of the events that led to the appointment of
the Lexow Committee, and of the issues of corruption it was created to
investigate). The Lexow Commission was followed by similar police corruption
investigations by the Curran Committee in 1913, the Seabury Investigation in
1932 and the Hefland Investigation in 1955. See 2 NEW YORK CITY POLICE
CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONS, 1894-1994 vii-x (Gabriel J. Chin
ed., 1997) (detailing the origins, goals and results of the Curran investigations).
2 The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the
City's Anti-Corruption Procedures, also known as the Knapp Commission, was
formed to address widespread reports of corruption within the New York City
Police Department. See 5 NEW YORK CITY POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION
COMMISSIONS, 1894-1994 vii-x (Gabriel J. Chin ed., 1997) (providing an
overview of the scandal which prompted the formation of the Knapp Commission
and the results of its investigation).
' New York City police officer Frank Serpico testified before the Knapp
Commission regarding corruption within the Police Department. Id. at vii. Prior
to his testimony, Serpico was branded as an outcast and whistle blower by fellow
NYPD officers. Tony Allen-Mills, Serpico Guns for New Breed of Bent Cop,
TIMES (London), Sept. 28, 1997, at 20 (providing a retrospective account of
Serpico's service as a police officer, and his assistance in anti-corruption
investigations into the NYPD). Serpico was portrayed by actor Al Pacino in a
1973 motion picture chronicling the officer's life and involvement in anti-
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The most recent investigation of police corruption has been
carried out by the Mollen Commission,4 established in 1992 under
the chairmanship of the Honorable Milton Mollen, who we are
honored to have today as one of our speakers. In addition, last
summer, Mayor Giuliani set up a task force5 in the wake of the
Abner Louima incident 6 and similar allegations of police miscon-
duct. Both the Mollen Commission and the Mayor's Task Force
came to the conclusion that while the majority of police officers are
honest and hardworking, there is a serious problem of police
corruption and the closely associated problem of police violence.
corruption investigations. SERPICO (Paramount Pictures 1973).
4 See 6 NEW YORK CITY POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMIS-
SIONS, 1894-1994 vii-xi (Gabriel J. Chin ed., 1997) (summarizing the creation
and findings of the Mollen Commission).
' On August 19, 1997, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani introduced
his Police/Community Relations Task Force to investigate reported incidents of
police abuse in the NYPD's 70th Precinct. Ellis Henican, A Big Task Ahead For
This Particular Force, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 20, 1997, at A5.
6 In August 1997, Haitian immigrant Abner Louima levied allegations of
physical and sexual abuse by several members of the NYPD following his arrest.
Dan Barry, Charges of Brutality: The Overview; Officer Charged in Man 's
Torture at Station House, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at Al. On August 9,
1997, Louima was arrested by NYPD officers following a scuffle outside a
nightclub in Brooklyn. Id. Louima alleges that, following his arrest, police
officers from the NYPD's 70th precinct attacked him in the station house. Id.
Among Louima's most publicized accusations was that the accused officers had
sodomized him with the wooden handle of a toilet plunger. See David
Kocieniewski, Injured Man Says Brooklyn Officers Tortured Him in Custody,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at BI (describing Abner Louima's allegations of
police brutality while he was in the custody of officers at the 70th Precinct).
Louima's accusations sparked a firestorm of controversy regarding the behavior
of New York City police officers. See John Kifner, Thousands Call on City Hall
To Confront Police Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1997, at 3 (chronicling the
"Day of Outrage" march on August 29, 1997, across the Brooklyn Bridge to City
Hall by over 7,000 citizens in response to the Louima accusations). The Louima
case also served as the catalyst for the creation of Mayor Giuliani's Task Force
on Police/Community Relations. Alan Finder, At The Heart of Report on Police,
Some Modest Proposals, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1998, at B2. Five New York City
police officers have been charged by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern
District of New York for their roles in the alleged assault on Louima. Henri E.
Cauvin, Rally for Louina, DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 10, 1998, at 18.
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We are fortunate today to have a panel of speakers, each of
whom has spent a number of years studying these issues and has
come to various conclusions about the causes of police violence and
the cures for it. I look forward to their presentations and to the
stimulating discussion among us that I hope will follow. I'd now
like to introduce Professor Eve Cary who will moderate this
afternoon's program. Professor Cary teaches legal writing, criminal
law and appellate advocacy here at Brooklyn Law School. She has
fought the problem of police violence from various perspectives,
having been a special Assistant District Attorney in the Brooklyn
District Attorney's Office and currently as an attorney with the
Legal Aid Society and New York Civil Liberties Union.

Professor Eve Cary*
Welcome to Brooklyn Law School and to the Fourteenth
Annual Edward V Sparer Public Interest Law Fellowship Forum.
I am honored to introduce our speakers today First, however, I
want to take one minute to tell you a little bit about the Sparer
Program. The Program was established in 1965 in honor of Ed
Sparer, who was a Brooklyn Law School Alumnus and a pioneer
in the fields of poverty law and health law. At the time of his
death, he was a professor of law on central welfare policy at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. The Sparer Program
provides stipends for students who spend ten weeks during the
summer during law school working under the supervision of
attorneys at nearly any non-profit legal office that serves under
served communities. The program is really a creation of Professor
Elizabeth Schneider, who is supported by the generosity of
Brooklyn Law School.
The Sparer Committee is made up of faculty members and
administration members at the law school, all of whom have
careers in public interest law. The program has grown enormously
during the past decade. This summer we will be placing twenty-one
students who will do a wide variety of public interest work. Other
students have completed incredible placements; the students have
worked at a number of offices in the ACLU [American Civil
Liberties Union], Legal Services, Legal Aid offices, the Center for
Reproductive Law and Policy, Central America Refugee Commit-
tee; they have done work on human rights issues, mental and
physical handicap issues, gay and lesbian issues, and have worked
in Native American law offices out west. They have gone to
wonderful foreign countries, and not so wonderful foreign coun-
tries. We've had students that have worked in Brazil, Jamaica,
South Africa, and it has been very exciting.
. Associate Professor of Legal Writing, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., New
York University School of Law; B.A., Sarah Lawrence College.
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Another goal of the Sparer Committee, besides simply provid-
ing stipends, is to set up essentially an old boy/girl network of
Brooklyn Law School faculty and alumni who will help students
get jobs, because it is very competitive being in public interest.
Additionally, a program goal is to give public interest a presence
at Brooklyn Law School. We do this by finding speakers to come
speak to us at events like this one. We also hold informal lunch-
eons to give all of us ideas about the various ways in which
lawyers can practice in the public interest-not simply through full-
time jobs, but by leading pro bono into the private practice of law.
I think our panel today exemplifies the various twists and turns that
a public interest career can take, so I would like to introduce each
of the speakers.
Judge Milton Mollen is a Renaissance man and a New York
institution. It might be easier to tell you what he hasn't done than
what he has. His first encounters with the police were in 1944
when, as an aviation cadet in the U.S. Army shot down over
occupied France, he was captured by the Germans, put in a prison
work camp from which he managed to escape about a year later,
and joined the British occupied forces. That wasn't enough for one
lifetime. He came back, went to St. John's Law School and
graduated with honors, then went on to a very distinguished career
in city and state government. He began working on housing issues,
went on to become a judge of the criminal court as well as the
Presiding Justice of the [New York State Court of Appeals] Second
Department, and also sat on the Court of Appeals by special
designation. He returned to city government after that, among other
things, acting as Deputy Mayor for public safety. The real reason
we have him here today is that he was Chairman of the Special
Commission to investigate corruption within the Police Department
of the City of New York. This was known as the Mollen Commis-
sion, and Judge Mollen will be discussing it today.
Bill Kuntz spent basically the first half of his life in Harvard.
He went there as an undergraduate. He got an M.A. and Ph.D. in
history, then a law degree-and then he managed to escape from
there. He then went into private practice, and now does commercial
litigation. He is a partner at Seward & Kissel, and is also an
adjunct Professor at Brooklyn Law School. He teaches American
Legal History and is the author of a book on criminal sentencing
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in the nineteenth century in the cities. He's here specifically
because he spent many years since 1987 on the Civilian Complaint
Review Board in various incarnations.
Deborah Small is a native New Yorker. She graduated from the
Center for Legal Education, a city college, in 1983. She is another
Harvard Law School graduate, having graduated in 1987. She spent
a number of years in private practice and is now the legislative
director for the New York Civil Liberties Union ["NYCLU"],'
where she works lobbying the legislature on various civil liberties
issues. She is the principal author of the New York Civil Liberties
Union Report on Civil Liberties and Welfare Reform. The reason
she is here today is that she is one of the drafters of the New York
Civil Liberties Union Dissenting Report from the Mayor's Task
Force Report, called Deflecting Blame.2 Her interest in the police
and the police violence is also connected to the fact that she is the
mother of a twenty-one year-old black male.
Finally, I have to digress a little bit in introducing Paul
Chevigny, who is responsible for most of the good things in my
life. He is a Professor of Law at New York University, where he
teaches criminal law, evidence, and a clinic on human rights.
I'll tell you a personal story. When I first got out of college in
1965, I went to work in publishing, as we all did in those days. I
worked at Mademoiselle magazine telling people what to wear. It
was the middle of the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights move-
ment, and I was very unhappy feeling that history was passing me
by while I was talking about shoes. Meanwhile, Paul had just been
hired to be the director of the Police Practices Project at the
NYCLU. I'm told that this man didn't know how the hell he could
At the time of publication, Deborah Small was no longer the legislative
director of the New York Civil Liberties Union.
2 See Alan Finder, At The Heart of Report on Police, Some Modest
Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at B2 (discussing the inception of Mayor
Giuliani's Task Force on Police/Community Relations in the wake of the Abner
Louima police brutality accusations). The New York Civil Liberties Union
authored a response to the Task Force's findings in the form of its Dissenting
Report. New York Civil Liberties Union, Deflecting Blame (visited Nov. 8,
1998) <http://www.nyclu.org/blamel.html> [hereinafter Deflecting Blame]
(discussing the failure of Mayor Giuliani's Task Force on Police/Community
Relations to improve perceived lawlessness with the NYPD).
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get a secretary for $95 a week, and Aryeh Neier3 said, "Oh, we'll
find some college girl who wants to do good in the world." The
next day I walked in the door and I did want to do good in the
world. Moreover, I'd only been making $65 a week. I just thought
I'd died and gone to heaven, and I turned out to be right. The next
two and a half years working for the Practicing Project were two
of the most interesting in my life. As a result, I went to law school.
Paul wrote a book entitled Police Power,4 which is a study of
police abuses in New York City. His next book, Cops and Rebels5
continued this. For the past decade he has been working on a major
comparison of police abuses in cities in the Americas, that
produced reports and articles for Human Rights Watch on police
abuses in Jamaica, Brazil and Argentina. His book Edge of the
Knife6 compares the New York and Los Angeles police depart-
ments. He will give us a comparative view.
' At the time referred to by Professor Cary, Aryeh Neier was Executive
Director of the NYCLU.
4 PAUL CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK CITY
(1969).
' PAUL CHEVIGNY, COPS AND REBELS: A STUDY OF PROVOCATION (1972).
6 PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAS (1995).
Professor Paul G. Chevigny*
This panel is a little one-sided in that there are no people on it
who think that police violence is not really a problem. That being
the case, I am going to try to talk about both sides in the course of
this discussion. Police violence and police brutality has been a
social problem that has beset all urban communities in the U.S. and
increasingly, the rest of the world.
The first thing that we have to get straight is that violence is
part of the police job. Violence itself isn't illegitimate. Use of
legitimate violence-violence for the purpose of enforcing a rule
that other people will not otherwise obey-is part of the job. Police
are the line of last resort when something cannot be solved by an
order, cannot be solved by negotiation, and must be solved by
literally pushing someone to do something. They are the people
who have to do it.
The problem becomes one of defining the line between the
legitimate use of violence and the illegitimate use of violence. We
have to distinguish the excessive use of force and police brutality
Force may be excessive, but it may be partly accidental. It may be
a mistake in judgment. When we talk about police brutality we are
ordinarily talking about something which is beyond a mere mistake
in judgment. It is either a deliberate or reckless act that results in
the injury of a person, without legitimate justification in the police
job. That gives rise, inevitably, to problems of control, because
there's a line-drawing problem in virtually every case that involves
the police. Acts of violence by the police, particularly in neighbor-
hoods with many poor people who have a lot of contact with the
police, ordinarily cause feeling to run high. Regardless of what may
ultimately be the justification for the act, there's a controversy
about almost every incident. As to the causes of police violence,
then, part of it is built into the structure of modern law, as the law
is enforced ultimately by force. But as to the use of illegitimate
. Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; LL.B., Harvard
Law School; B.A., Yale University.
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force; that is, the use of excessive or brutal force by the police:
why does it happen?
Excessive or brutal force happens partly because people like us
want it to happen. I don't necessarily mean the people on this
panel, or the people in the room. But among people like us-peo-
ple who have something to lose, who have a stake in society-there
is a wide spread folk belief that violating the law protects people.
We've all heard people say, "Well, if the police have to kick a
little butt in order to keep order, so be it." How could that possibly
be right? That you have to do something which is not sanctioned
by the law in order to make people safe.
There really isn't very much empirical evidence, one way or the
other, that violating the law protects people. There is empirical
evidence about the use of deadly force. The folk belief used to be
that, if the police didn't use their guns as profligately as they did
in the 1960's and early 1970's, the police would be in greater
danger and civilians would be in greater danger, in the sense that
the crime rate would go up. It would, therefore, not be a wise
policy to impose more restrictions on police use of deadly force.
Largely, deadly force is something that you can measure, unlike
police brutality which is certainly almost impossible to measure.
Studies were done by people like James Fyfe' that found that a
radical reduction in the use of deadly force, which was brought
about in the early 1970's, didn't make any difference in the crime
rate, didn't make any difference in the arrest rate and didn't make
any difference in the safety of officers. In the long run the number
See James Fyfe, Administrative Interventions on Police Shooting
Discretion, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 309 (1979).
PANEL DISCUSSION
of police officers shot and the number of civilians shot declined.2
We can guess the reasons.
Further, one of the reasons there is police violence-illegitimate
police violence-is because there's a story that almost all people
may be telling in society: that it is the job of the police to keep
order; it is not the job of the law, it is the job of the police; not
through the law, but through direct action in the streets to maintain
safety. This is a very widespread belief throughout the western
world, particularly in America. It gives rise to a lot of police
violence because the politicians encourage it: "If we could just get
the judges out of the way, if we could just stop these ridiculous
applications of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and let the police
do their jobs, society would be so much safer."3 Well, that
rhetoric, which is very common in the United States and elsewhere
in the Americas, is advancing the idea that it is the job of the
police to operate outside the law, independent of the law, on their
own authority. And, ultimately, if they do not use the law; if they
do not use the arrest power to take people to court and charge them
with a crime, then the police are going to have to use violence in
place of their arrest power. They do so when they are encouraged
by those beliefs to do so.
2 Police killings of civilians fell from 353 in 1971 to 172 in 1984 in the fifty
largest cities in the United States. Report Says Tighter Policies Reduce Killings
By The Police, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1986, at A20. In New York, killings by the
police dropped to 173 for the period 1981-84 as opposed to 314 from 1970-74.
Id. Killings of police officers in New York City also fell from eighteen for the
period 1974-78, to sixteen for the period 1978-1983, and such killings again
decreased to thirteen from 1983-1989. Ralph Blumenthal, Killings by New York
Police Drop, Bucking Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, at 35. Many commenta-
tors see the drop as attributable to more sophisticated training and tighter controls
on police use of force. Andrew H. Malcolm, Change in Enforcement is Said to
Cut Violence Between Police and Public, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1990, at section
1, 32.
3 See Michael A. Fletcher, Changes in Police Tactics Trigger Charges of
Brutality, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1997, at A3 (quoting Ronald A. Hampton,
executive director of the National Black Police Association stating: "Politicians
and police have said that for us to deal with [urban crime] effectively, you
almost have to be willing to give up some of your rights and privileges.").
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A lot of police confuse the order-keeping function that they
perform with the law, so that when there is a defiance of an order
given by a policeman, whether it is legally justified or not, they
feel that there is a tremendous threat to them. That is one of the
reasons why vehicle chases so often result in violence, as in the
Rodney King case.4 A vehicle chase is an adrenaline-producing
episode anyway. But it is also a tremendous threat to authority; it
is defiance.5 A driver is being ordered to stop, and in response
does something very dangerous-racing the car through traffic,
threatening peoples' lives.6 That is a tremendous threat to authority
and it is also a violation of law. Unless someone is injured in such
a chase, it is not a terribly serious violation of law, but it very
frequently results in some kind of a violent sanction, as in the King
case.
7
Another piece of our commonplace rhetoric that leads to these
cases is the "Military Model." We speak of a "war on crime," and
the police have to be the army in that war on crime. If the police
act like an army, people may feel as though they are an occupying
army There is already rhetoric that the police are an occupying
army in the ghetto. A military acts against an enemy. Ordinarily,
they wear different color uniforms for that very purpose, so they
shoot at the "right" people. So, the military analogy almost
invariably leads to a breakdown in respect for law because the
police act like an army. But the police are not military at all. The
police are civilians. They are acting with other civilians. They are
' Police officers often suffer from "high-speed pursuit syndrome," a
condition that results in an adrenaline rush brought on by the challenge of
authority displayed by a suspect in a high-speed automobile chase. Mark Petix,
Danger Brings Out the Fight in Qfficers, Psychologists Say, THE PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (California), April 3, 1996, at A4. This adrenaline rush has been
partially blamed for the behavior of Los Angeles police officers who attacked
motorist Rodney King in 1991. Susan Christian, Orange County Police Criticize
Violent Arrest; Some Speculate on How it Occurred, L.A. Times, March 9, 1991,
at A22. Following a high-speed chase, King was dragged from his vehicle and
"was repeatedly hit with nightsticks and kicked by officers while as many as 11
other officers stood by." Id.
Petix, supra note 4, at A4.
6 Petix, supra note 4, at A4.
Christian, supra note 4, at A22.
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supposed to make their decisions by evaluating individuals on a
case-by-case basis. There is no enemy. We, the other civilians, are
the enemy.
I want to talk about the "cures" briefly. There aren't any real
cures. Police violence isn't going to go away. The controversy over
whether violence is justified in given cases is never going to go
away, although it can, of course, be minimized. One thing I want
to say about the cures is that the situation has gotten a lot better in
the thirty years since I started working on this problem. The
amount of deadly force since the early 1970's has dropped fifty
percent in the major cities. 8 If you take them as a whole, it is true
in every city. It is not true in Los Angeles. But it is true, that in
New York City deadly force dropped much more than fifty percent.
In 1971, which was the high tide, just before the reforms were put
in, the police killed eighty-seven people. 9 Now, if the police kill
fifteen every year, it is a large number.
There is also much less violence to extract confessions. If the
Abner Louima case turns out to be sustained, that is a case of
torture, although not for the purpose of extracting a confession.
Torture by the police has really dropped enormously since the days
of the Miranda decision.'" Much longer ago, in the early police
reports in the 1930's, torture was virtually universal in U.S. police
departments.
Now to give the internal controls their due, many effective
reforms are internal controls. The control of deadly force is largely
the result of a change in regulations, which was forced by the
departments themselves, and has led to the decreasing use of deadly
force and a decrease in deaths. The attack on the use of violence to
extract confessions, of course, was led by the courts, but the police
cooperated. Those most violent abuses have passed from the scene
because of increasing accountability.
Eve Cary asked me to say a little comparing other nations. The
rhetoric in Latin America with respect to police violence is very
similar. It's chillingly similar about the Military Model, and letting
8 PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAS 66-67 (1995).
9 Id. at 66.
'0 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the police do their job and getting the courts out of the way. That
rhetoric is all there, but the level of violence is incredibly,
astronomically higher. There are cultural differences with respect
to the use of violence, but one of the big differences is impunity
and lack of accountability. There is a lot more accountability here
in the U.S., and it has taken us a couple of generations to develop
it. It is enormously important.
About that accountability: Los Angeles had a bigger scandal
than New York about police violence. But I think that L.A. is
doing a better job of control at this point than New York. We have
a civilian review board, which is an excellent body, but the police
are doing, to put it brutally, their best to make it as ineffective as
they can. They do not cooperate. They do not discipline in a many
cases where the board finds the complaints justified. Until the
pressure from the Louima case," the Mayor was trying to starve
the organization. Moreover, a review board that just takes com-
plaints on a case-by-case basis cannot do the job, particularly
without political cooperation. We need auditors who will oversee
the department, to make sure that requested reforms are carried out.
The Mayor's own task force called for such an auditor, and the
Mayor refused to do it.
More than an effective auditor, we need somebody inside the
Department. An Inspector General acts as a conveyor belt, a vector,
who will get on the Commissioner's back and say, "You've got to
do these things, you can't just be talking about them, you have to
do them. What are we going to report to the auditor that we have
done to carry out these reforms?"
Finally, I want to talk just briefly about the tort system. The
tort system, with respect to the control of police brutality, at this
point is, in L.A. and New York and in most big cities, totally
ineffective. Millions of dollars are paid in damages and the city
does nothing to convey to the police department that there are
" See Dan Barry, Charges of Brutality. The Overview; Officer Charged in
Man's Torture at Station House, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at Al (discussing
the Louima accusations of police brutality); Alan Finder, At The Heart of Report
on Police, Some Modest Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at B2
(discussing formation of the Mayor's task force to investigate the matter).
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systemic problems. The cities do not survey their dockets to find
out what is wrong systematically.
When an enormous civil judgment is made against an officer,
nothing is put into his file. People that have worked at municipal
departments have tried to change this, but this is an index of the
fact that, underneath the surface, these cities essentially don't care
about this problem. They really think that it's the cost of doing
business. There may be a payout of millions of dollars, and if you
ask, "What would you do to create a nexus between these enor-
mous judgments and the problem of police brutality?" they say
nothing in reply. That attitude is an index of the fact that the cities
really do not care to do anything effectively about it.

Hon. Milton Mollen*
Unlike Paul, I was an adjunct professor, not a full professor, so
I can speak while I'm seated. I think Paul was correct to say that
all of us on the panel here perceive police violence to be a
problem. I do think that it's a problem to be kept in the proper
perspective. Paul remarked on whether we can assist in that goal,
and I intend to do the same thing; to make certain that it is kept in
proper perspective.
First of all, I will tell you, as is said in my report,' that we
found that the overwhelming majority of police officers are not
corrupt; they are not brutal. However, the problem does exist.
When I speak about the causes, I want to make clear that I am not
using "causes" as a synonym for "justification." But I do think we
have to look at what the causes are in order to address the potential
for cures. I could sum up the causes, in a broad sense, to the
frailties of human nature. But I'm supposed to speak for fifteen
minutes, so I will elaborate on that.
When I say human nature, I mean that there are possibly 38,000
police officers in the City of New York. 2 I suggest to you that if
you take 38,000 of any group-lawyers, judges, law students, ditch
diggers, clergymen-you're going to find a certain percentage who
are venal, who are weak, who are susceptible to doing the wrong
thing, particularly under pressure. It is therefore not surprising that
" Chairman, Special Commission to Investigate Corruption Within the Police
Department of the City of New York, 1990-1992; Presiding Justice, Appellate
Division, Second Department of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
1978-1990; LL.B., St. John's University School of Law; B.S., St. John's
University.
' THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF
POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, COMMISSION REPORT (1994) (Hon. Milton Mollen, Chair)
[hereinafter MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT].
2 In 1996, the New York City Police Department was the largest in the
country, employing 36,813 full-time officers. Justice Dept. Reports Sharp Rise
in Police Officers on Patrol, WASH. POST, June 8, 1998, at A8.
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among a department of 38,000 you are going to find some that will
do the wrong thing, whether it be in form of money corruption, or
brutality or excessive violence. The use of power is a form of
corruption. So, it's not unusual to find that some police officers are
going to do the wrong thing, including using excessive violence-at
times rising to the level of brutality
There are additional factors affecting how a police officer
performs his or her job. First, there is the fact that the law of
averages will tend to bring out some who do the wrong thing. This
is exacerbated by the fact that there are some people who are
drawn to a police department; who want to be police officers
because they like the concept of power. Sometimes that power
becomes abusive power. Take a young police officer coming out of
the academy. The police department gives him a club, gives him a
gun and gives him the power to arrest. When I was presiding judge
of the Appellate Division, even I did not have the power to arrest.
Yet, this young officer has this power, along with all of these other
accouterments of his job.
Furthermore, the job tensions are enormous. It is a difficult and
dangerous job for a police officer out on the street, and there are
tensions that go with the need to protect one's safety, one's
partner's safety and the public's safety.3 Suppose the police officer
and his partner get a call to go, at 3 o'clock in the morning, into
a dark alley There is a suspicion that a robbery is going on. The
officers go into that alley, and someone, a robber, comes rushing
at them. It is fine for us to sit and argue calmly and coolly about
how we would handle that situation, but the officer in that alley has
' The job tensions are created in large part by community residents:
Most of all, cops feel they are scorned, feared and mistrusted by the
residents of poor, drug-infested neighborhoods they are trying to help.
So it is no wonder they lose it once in a while and lean a little too
hard on civilians. Nobody understands what it's like to live in fear that
some crazy kid will cut you in half with a machine gun. Nobody but
a cop can know the daily diet of frustration, temptation and provoca-
tion they are forced to eat.
John McLaughlin, "Us Against Them, " Cops Have Reason to Feel Besieged But
No Excuse for Rogues, STAR-LEDGER (New Jersey), Oct. 5, 1993, available in
1993 WL 3490872.
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to confront that robber immediately He should identify himself,
show his badge, he should say "Stop!"-all those things are proper
police procedure. But one should understand that sometimes the
circumstances call for a different action, a reflex action. Reflex is
not necessarily justified, but sometimes one has to understand that,
under those circumstances, an officer may not act in an ideal
fashion. There are all kinds of street confrontations, and some
should be understood in terms of the need for the use of violence.
All indications are that violence, in and of itself, is part of the job.
The question is: when do you step over the line to excessive
violence and brutality? Unfortunately, sometimes the police do step
over the lines. I have mentioned that the job creates tensions which
ultimately lead to that kind of violent conduct. In addition to that,
you have, unfortunately, the police culture.
This is not unique to New York. I remember reading Joseph
Wambaugh's books4 many years ago. He is a former police officer
of the Los Angeles Police Department. He wrote about the brutality
and the "us vs. them" culture that is very much part of almost any
police department. Any one who has studied a police department
will tell you that it is'an inherent aspect of police work that officers
develop an "us against them" mentality, whereby they see anyone
other than members of their colors in the police department as
being "them, not part of us." This leads to confrontations that many
times should not take place.
The problem of police brutality is further enhanced by the fact
that a city, such as New York, is a cosmopolitan city that has many
different cultural groups and a lack of understanding of different
cultural groups on the part of many police officers. I, for one, feel
very strongly that it wouldn't be a cure, but it would be helpful, if
we had a residency requirement for police officers in the City of
New York. I think that would increase the likelihood that we could
get police officers of various cultures that do live in this city who
have a great understanding of the people in this city
Now I would like for a moment to address some of our
potential cures. There is no single cure for police violence. Paul
' Joseph Wambaugh writes police fiction novels. Some representative works
include FUGITIVE NIGHTS (1992) and THE DELTA STAR (1984).
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said it, and I agree totally. We're not going to cure it because of
some of the facts that I've mentioned here. But what we can do,
certainly, is not just surrender and say "Well, it is inevitable, it is
going to take place, and therefore it is a necessary part of polic-
ing." I think it can be controlled.
For example, there are internal controls. I say that it is the
responsibility of the leadership of the police department and the
leadership of the city government to establish internal controls that
will minimize the amount of excessive force and brutality within
the department.
I'll mention briefly some of the things that the Mollen Commis-
sion suggested. We recommended that the minimum age limit for
new police officers should be increased from twenty to twenty-two
years-old. This has been implemented by the Police Department.
The Commission felt that we'd like to see that police officers on
the street have some sense of maturity, responsibility and self-
discipline. In that regard, we recommended increasing the age to
twenty-two, and also requiring two years of college education or its
equivalent-for example, military service.5 Some of those who go
into the military at the age of eighteen come out at the age of
twenty-two. Presumably-hopefully-a person going into the
military will gain some sense of self-discipline, maturity and
responsibility.
We also felt that the Department was totally remiss in its
investigation of potential candidates.6 The director of training for
' Applicants to the NYPD in 1998 must have completed either 60 semester
credits at an accredited university or college, or must possess a high school
diploma with two years honorable military service. New York City Department
of Citywide Administrative Services, Notice of Examination (visited Nov. 15,
1998) <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/nyclink/html/dcas/html/police.html>.
6 See MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 112-17. The Mollen
Commission Report ascribes many problems in the New York City Police
Department to "hastily conducted" background investigations that allow
applicants with juvenile felony adjudications or drug problems to become
officers, frequently before background checks are completed. MOLLEN
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 113-14. The NYPD "blame[d] these
delays and oversights on the heavy workload of applicant investigators," a
condition perhaps exacerbated by the large number of New York City Police
Academy graduates-6,000 from 1992-1994. MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT,
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the Police Department, the Deputy Commissioner, testified at
hearings and admitted that the training was totally inadequate.7
There is a great deal of room for improvement. I believe that they
are improving their training, and there is definitely a need for it.
There has to be an emphasis on self-control, on not using violence,
except when it is warranted, and then only to the extent that it is
warranted and justified. We said that there should be greater
amounts of psychological investigation. Some people just are not
fit to be police officers. They are fit to do a lot of other things, but
not to be police officers.
I think that there should be a greater emphasis on the cultural
diversification in this city. There are various cultural groups, racial
groups, ethnic groups that comprise the citizens of our city. There
should be great understanding on the part of the police officer who
goes into these communities. The fact is, some cultural groups
socialize at night, on their stoops, in their community and on their
streets. It is part of the culture they come from, and it is part of the
culture here. I don't say this to allow violations of the law, or to
allow people to disturb their neighbors, because they are accus-
tomed to certain things, but there is a way of dealing with it if you
have understanding. I think that can be done if you can educate and
reform and train people to understand more about other groups.
supra note 1, at 115.
7 MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 119-23. With regard
particularly to integrity training, "[m]ost officers found that their instructors were
mediocre; that they lacked teaching abilities and practical experience; that they
relied almost exclusively on materials from outdated lesson plans with little
relevance to the challenges facing officers today; and therefore lacked credibility
with their classes." MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 119. Further,
the Mollen Commission found that New York City Police Academy training
itself could lead to the corruption of new recruits:
[M]any officers told us [at the Commission] that it was at the
Academy where they first became immersed in the attitudes of a police
culture that promote and protect corruption. In both public and private
hearings, officers testified that interaction with instructors and other
recruits at the Academy began their acculturation into the dynamics of
police culture and the perceived necessity of self-protection and
tolerance for police misconduct.
MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 119.
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We on the Commission also found a total lack of supervision
of police officers.8 Students of police and models of the police
department will tell you that there should be approximately one
sergeant for every ten police officers. 9 We found that in some
precincts there was one sergeant for thirty to thirty-five police
officers.'" In fact, at night when you need them most, there is
sometimes only one sergeant covering two precincts." Clearly,
this represents inadequate supervision. When we asked officers
8 MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 79-84. The Mollen
Commission found that the failure of supervision permeated the New York City
Police Department from the top down. For example, many precinct supervisors
did not believe it was their job to unearth and correct corruption, and many,
fearing a loss of acceptance and other repercussions from supervisors, had
difficulty moving from patrol officer to supervisor, engaging in what the
commission called "willful blindness" to precinct corruption. MOLLEN
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 80. Further, Police Commissioners and
top managers failed to perceive and correct these supervisory problems. MOLLEN
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 82. The Mollen Commission also noted
that the number of supervisors at the precinct level was inadequate. MOLLEN
COMMISSION REPORT, supi-a note 1, at 82.
9 MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 82.
'o MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 82. The Commission
referred to this ratio as "unmanageable" and "too large to effectively supervise
... subordinates." MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 82.
'' MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 82. One former
probationary sergeant from the 75th precinct was "routinely" placed in
supervision of two precincts that were known to be "corruption-ridden." MOLLEN
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 82. One lieutenant "was given the
impossible task of being the sole supervisor for three precincts on a Saturday
night," supported only by two walkie-talkie radios. MOLLEN COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 82. Many officers performed their duties with no
supervision at all. MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 82. In addition
to their supervisory tasks, many sergeants were required to handle heavy
paperwork loads, reducing the supervisory time available. MOLLEN COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 83. Sergeants were also frequently called to respond to
radio runs to fill in for busy patrol officers; because they performed the same
functions as patrol officers, their authority over those officers suffered. MOLLEN
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 83. The supervisory failures enumerated
by the Commission were "often the most acute in those crime-ridden precincts
where most corruption opportunities abound[ed], and where effective, experi-
enced supervisors [were] most needed." MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 1, at 83.
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during our investigation, at our public hearing, whether they were
concerned about their supervisors catching them doing things that
they shouldn't have been doing. They sneered and laughed and said
that was a silly question because there was no supervision. I think
that the Department should take some steps to rectify this situation
so that there is adequate supervision. The human tendency is that,
if you think you are under surveillance, if somebody is looking at
you, if you are responsible to someone who is there on the job
watching how you perform, then you are going to perform in a
much better way than you would if you were totally free to do
what you please. Supervision, we think, is an important aspect of
policing.
Most important of all-absolutely most important-is the sense
of commitment: the sense of commitment from the top level down
through the Department. The Police Commissioner must have that
sense of commitment. He must impart it through everyone in the
chain of command. Precinct commanders, borough commanders
and prison commanders all have to understand that they will be
held accountable. Accountability is the other side of the coin of
commitment. If people know they will be held accountable under
supervision, then individual police officers will know that there is
zero tolerance. The concept is then understood that there will be
zero tolerance so that, if you use excessive force, you are going to
have to answer for it.
Paul [Chevigny] made the point, and Bill [Kuntz] will elaborate
on it, that the Civilian Complaint Review Board ["CCRB"] has
made recommendations and has found that in many instances that
there was an excessive use of violence and force, and yet in many
instances, the punishment that was meted out was relatively
minor. 2 Clearly that does not discourage the kind of brutality that
2 See McLaughlin, supra note 3 (noting that after the creation of the all-
civilian Board, New York City Mayor Giuliani "want[ed] a return to a board
evenly split between police officials and civilians-an us-against-them
arrangement that resulted in very few findings against cops charged with brutality
and was roundly distrusted by minority leaders"); Sheryl McCarthy, N. Y. Cop
Review Doesn't Work, NEWSDAY (New York), Sept. 23, 1992, at 4 (noting
problems with the CCRB, including a low rate of substantiation of civilian
complaints, and the low rate of punishment for officer against whom claims were
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takes place on occasion. It is, therefore, important that there be a
sense of commitment from everyone from the top down, as well as
a sense of accountability.
I would just briefly touch on a two more issues. In addition to
the price that we pay for brutality individually, millions and
millions of dollars are paid out by the city every year for acts of
brutality by police officers. An enormous amount of money is spent
by the city as a result of law suits that are brought up on behalf of
the victims of brutality.'3
Another insidious impact of brutality and excessive violence,
coupled with corruption, is jury nullification. Jury nullification
occurs when a jury finds people not guilty of crimes, where there
is a good deal of proof, but where the proof consists of testimony
by police officers.' 4 This practice indicates a lack of comfort with,
and faith in, police officers as a result of the negative impression
people get because of these acts of violence and corruption.' 5
I remember when I started out as a trial judge a long, long time
ago. When the police officers testified, and most of the cases were
criminal, police officers were used as witnesses. Almost automati-
cally there was a conviction. In the last few years, however, right
up to the present time, there has been case after case where there
is strong testimony, but it is a police officer's testimony. The jurors
substantiated). For example, after the Tompkins Square Park riot of 1988, the
CCRB handled 121 civilian complaints, only about a dozen officers were found
guilty, and only two of those received punishment, both in the form of
suspensions. Id.
" See David A. Love, What's Going On? Rising Tide of Police Brutality,
N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Apr. 26, 1997, at 13 (noting that money damages paid
to police brutality victims by New York City rose from $7 million in 1990 to
$32 million in 1996, and that from 1992-1997 the City paid out a total of over
$100 million to such victims).
" Jury nullification is "the practice of deciding to acquit the guilty based on
a juror's own sense of justice or fairness" rather than upon the law. Deborah
Pines, 'Nullification' Will Permit Juror's Removal, N.Y.L.J., May 21, 1997, at
I (describing a recent Second Circuit decision that allowed a judge to dismiss a
juror "where there is 'no doubt' that they 'engaged in nullification"'). Supporters
of jury nullification characterize it as a way to "humanize the law," while
detractors say it "invites anarchy." Id.
15 Id.
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are skeptical, and they don't trust the police. That is a very
unfortunate impact arising from the fact that, at times, police
officers do use brutality or are corrupt. It causes cynicism about the
criminal justice system, and our society suffers as a result. Really,
it is absolutely incumbent upon the leadership of the Police
Department and the leadership of the city government to make clear
that the City's Police Department is to be looked upon as a positive
factor-not as a negative factor; not as brutal and corrupt.
I think that part of rebuilding the image of the police is to bring
about a greater sense of relationship and interaction between the
community, and the members of the police department. I think that
it is imperative that be done. It is so important that the police
respect the members of the community, and members of the
community respect the police. A great deal of effective law
enforcement results from information provided by members of the
community, and, to the extent that there is a lack of confidence in
the police department, the result is less effective law enforcement.
In general, whether you are talking about brutality or corruption or
any of the other negative aspects of police and law enforcement, it
is important that there be mutual respect of the members of the
community and the members of the police department. I think that
is something that has to be worked at from both ends of the
perspective.

William F Kuntz If
Although I have also had the good fortune to serve as an
adjunct professor of law, I assure you that I have the good wisdom
never to deliver an address while seated in the presence of the
former presiding judge of the [Appellate Division] Second
Department and former deputy mayor. I have to begin with a
confession that, to serve on a panel with Judge Mollen, Professor
Chevigny, and Deborah Small is really the ultimate act of chutzpah
on my part, and tolerance on theirs, because these three individuals
have done a great deal, both recently and historically, to educate
New Yorkers about the police. Judge Mollen continues to remain
a model of the wise jurist and practical statesman. Professor
Chevigny is one of the reasons I wrote my doctoral thesis, which
was later published as a book, on criminal sentencing thirty years
ago.' Deborah Small will talk about the NYCLU's Dissent,2 and
will give you some insight as to the macro issues dealing with the
police.
My view, however, is a micro view of events from 1987 to the
present, from my tiny perch on the City's most talked about, and
perhaps least understood, agency, the Civilian Complaint Review
Board3 ["CCRB"]-also known as the ineffectual Civilian Com-
plaint Review Board, the lame Civilian Complaint Review Board,
the hopelessly conflicted Civilian Complaint Review Board, and the
" Adjunct Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Member, Civilian
Complaint Review Board; Partner, Seward & Kissel; J.D., Harvard University
Law School; A.B., A.M., Ph.D., Harvard University.
' WILLIAM F. KUNTZ II, CRIMINAL SENTENCING IN THREE NINETEENTH
CENTURY CITIES: A SPECIAL HISTORY OF PUNISHMENT IN NEW YORK,
PHILADELPHIA 1830-1880 (1988).
2 See infra comments of Deborah Small pp. 118-19 (discussing the
NYCLU's Dissenting Report to the Mayor's Task Force on Police/Community
Relations).
3 See Deardra Shuler, "Us Against Them ": Police Corruption and Brutality
(Part I), N.Y. BEACON, Aug. 14, 1996, at 2 (describing the genesis of the CCRB
in 1953 and its changes through 1996).
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weak Civilian Complaint Review Board.4 You can understand why
I have survived for eleven years on the CCRB.
I want to talk a bit about the CCRB's history, its significance
and what, in fact, may be its future. The CCRB actually began in
1953 when that noted civil libertarian J. Edgar Hoover-you are
allowed to laugh-noticed that the police had reported more stolen
cars in New York City than there were, in fact, cars in New York
City. The police were receiving kickbacks from the insurance
companies for false filings. As a result, the Police Commissioner
appointed three deputy commissioners to take complaints from the
public, i.e., civilian complaints. Hence, the name "Civilian
Complaint Review Board"-to deal with complaints about the
police department from the public, dealing with both corruption and
brutality.
In the 1960's, due to certain demographic and sociological
changes, particularly involving unease in the African-American
community, New York City Mayor John V Lindsay decided that
he would modify the CCRB by Executive Order by appointing
civilians.5 The reaction was fierce and immediate. The Policemen's
Benevolent Association vociferously opposed it. They ran a fear-
city campaign on television and radio. 6 They supported a
' See Chuck Bosetti, Pittsburgh Police: Betrayed & Abused, PITT. POST,
Dec. 14, 1997, at BI (quoting New York City Councilman Sheldon Leffler
stating: "[W]e created the CCRB out of a hope ... to bolster public confidence
in an independent civilian complaint process. But in the first four years it's really
questionable whether this has happened. There's a good chance that the reverse
has happened."); see also Sheryl McCarthy, N. Y. Cop Review Doesn't Work,
NEWSDAY (New York), Sept. 23, 1992, at 4 (noting public disaffection at the
low number of civilian complaints "substantiated" by the CCRB, the lack of
police officer testimony to the CCRB, and the disparity between redress provided
by the CCRB and the increasingly successful suits against the Police Department
in court).
' See Alan Finder, Council Votes to Broaden Police Panel, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1986, at BI ("[In 1966,] Mayor John V. Lindsay appointed four
outsiders to a seven-member panel [making up the CCRB]."). See also Selwyn
Raab, Charges of Brutality: The Force, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at 41
(providing a chronology of the CCRB).
6 The police officer's union, however, successfully pushed for a referendum
abolishing Mayor Lindsay's appointment of outsiders. Finder, supra note 5, at
BI. The Policemen's Benevolent Association ("PBA") campaigned against the
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deliberately confusing referendum: "Vote 'yes' if you oppose
civilian review." They warned of police in handcuffs. As a result,
the Lindsay Board containing civilians went down in a fiery demise
and decisive defeat. 7 I was a teenager, and it made a lasting
impression.
Post-Lindsay Board years saw the return of the CCRB as a
completely internal organ of the Police Department.8 But slowly,
almost imperceptibly, changes were put through. A black graffiti
artist, who was arrested, died of injuries received from beatings
received while in custody.9 A black grandmother, who was the
source of noxious odors and who was a public nuisance and needed
to be evicted from public housing, was shotgunned to death by an
officer described by former Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward
as "Robocop."' Low-level drug dealers who were dragged to a
civilian-member Board, leading to a referendum that spelled its defeat. Harold
Baer, Jr., Watching the Watchman, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 28, 1991, at 2. "The PBA
created an artificial and unjustified polarization in the community: anyone who
did not oppose the [civilian] board was 'anti-police."' Id. Police officers were as
misled as civilians; "cop[s] on the beat were told that the [civilian] board would
spell the professional and personal downfall of even the most reasonable among
the police officers." ld. Later opposition to civilian Boards used a somewhat
more reasoned approach. For example, in 1987, twenty years after Mayor
Lindsay's original proposal, the PBA claimed that civilian control of the Board
would hurt officer morale and fail to fairly evaluate their performance. Robert
D. McFadden, II Named to Civilian Police Panel After 20-Year Debate in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1987, at 1.
7 Mayor Lindsay's civilian Board was defeated in the referendum by a three-
to-two margin. See Baer, supra note 6, at 2.
8 See Finder, supra note 5, at B 1 (discussing the failure of the CCRB to
integrate civilians into the police review process).
' The graffiti artist referred to was Michael Stewart, who died on September
15, 1983 after six police officers accosted him, then beat him. Isabel Wilkerson,
Juiy Acquits All Transit Officers in 1983 Death of Michael Stewart, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 1985, at Al. Three of the officers were indicted on charges of
criminally negligent homicide; the remaining three were indicted on perjury
charges. Carol Vecchione, Transit Cops Charged in Beating Death, U.P.I., Feb.
21, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. All six officers were
subsequently acquitted. Wilkerson, supra, at Al.
0 The grandmother referred to was Eleanor Bumpurs, a 66 year-old black
woman with mental problems who lived in a government-subsidized apartment
in the Bronx. See Dan Collins, Tragedy in the Bronx, U.P.I., Nov. 9, 1984,
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police station in Queens were subjected to stun guns and cattle
prods"---devices reminiscent of Bull Connor 12 and the pre-
reincarnation of George Wallace.13
Finally, black and Latino New York City Council members and
their white allies convinced a skeptical Mayor Edward I. Koch and
a reluctant Police Commissioner Ward to appoint members of the
public to a new CCRB consisting of twelve members-six from the
public and six from the police department. 4 The mayoral
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (describing the entry by six white
officers wearing protective masks and plastic shields in to Bumpur's apartment,
which was filled "with mist and a harsh odor"). According to police officers,
Bumpurs faced the officers with a 10-inch knife and struck at one of them. Id.
Fearing she was about to stab the officer, Officer Stephen Sullivan, a 19-year
veteran of the police force, fired two shotgun blasts, killing her. Id. Officer
Sullivan was subsequently charged with first degree manslaughter. Officer
Charged with Manslaughter in Shotgun Killing of New York Woman, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1985, at 5.
" On April 22, 1985, a sergeant and a police officer from the 106th precinct
in Queens were arrested for assaulting a suspect with a stun-gun at a station
house to force a confession. William R. Greer, Turmoil in Troubled Precinct
Centers on "The Strip, " N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1985, at BI. The suspect, Marc
Davidson, an 18 year-old, had been arrested for selling ten dollars worth of
marijuana to an undercover policewoman. Id. Davidson was burned 40 times in
the incident. Id. One officer, Richard Pike, was convicted of torture in
connection with the incident. Ellis Henican, Stun-Gun Petition for Parole is
Probed, NEWSDAY (New York), Apr. 12, 1989, at 2.
2 The former Police Commissioner of Birmingham, Alabama, Theophilus
Eugene "Bull" Connor earned notoriety for deploying fire hoses against civil
rights protesters. Jeffrey A. Frank, Are There New Rules of History?: The
Transcendent Judgments of Electronic Imagery, WASH. POST, May 3, 1992, at
C3. See also David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker:
The Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F.
L. REV. 645 (1995) (describing violent opposition to civil rights protesters in the
summer of 1963).
" George C. Wallace was Governor of Alabama from 1962 to 1986.
Originally a supporter of segregation, he later supported integration. See Rick
Bragg, Quietly, Alabama Troopers Escort Wallace for Last Time, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 1998, at B15 (discussing the life and death of Wallace).
4 See McFadden, supra note 6, at 1 (reviewing the history of conflict
leading up to the appointment of the new CCRB members under Mayor Koch,
and listing the names and backgrounds of the first eleven members of the new
panel).
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appointees were appointed upon advice and approval of the City
Council, and the Police Commissioner appointed six Deputy
Commissioners to the Board.'5
I was appointed in that first group of public and civilian
commissioners who took office in Fall 1987. I served from 1987
to 1992 when I resigned, having proved too progressive for some,
too conservative for others, and too ornery for just about every-
body. Much to my surprise, I was asked by city officials to testify
as an elder statesman about the need to have a police presence on
an external CCRB at the time of large police demonstrations during
City Council hearings on the Board. Much to my shock, I was
invited to return to the CCRB in 1993. I have, therefore, the
dubious distinction of being the only member of the 1987 Board to
still be at the CCRB several years later. From that vantage point,
I have seen some of the good, the bad and the ugly things that we
have defined as police misconduct. I want to speak briefly to the
issues of what police misconduct is, how we define it and how we
stop it.
There are three micro-examples I would like to provide; the
true experts-the Judge, professor and civil libertarian will provide
the macro-examples. For example, the Military Model' 6 is very
inapposite when applied to the police department, because in the
military, most of the discretion resides in the commander. The
"grunts" in the field have virtually no discretion. In the police
world, however, most of the discretion resides in junior officers
who are unsupervised, or as the judge indicated, under-supervised
in the field.'" This is a major difference between the military and
police models. The point was also made by the professor about the
interplay between tort law and awards against the police.' 8 There
is the saying in the police department: "It is better to be judged by
I McFadden, supra note 6, at 1.
6 See supra comments of Paul Chevigny at p. 88 (explaining the "Military
Model").
"7 See supra comments of Hon. Milton Mollen pp. 98-99 (describing the
failure of police to properly supervise officers in the field).
8 See supra comments of Professor Paul Chevigny pp. 90-91 (describing the
tort system's reaction to police brutality).
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twelve than carried by six." That saying is their internal mantra
with respect to whether or not to take action.
I would like to give three micro-examples of the kinds of cases
that we have confronted, with no names obviously, but real cases,
on the old Board and new Board. In the first case, a woman calls
the Board to file a complaint on behalf of her teenage son. She
says that an officer has uttered an ethnic slur against her son. The
cop said, according to the woman, "Be careful boy, don't you know
cops are shooting niggers out here?" The wrinkle, of course, is that
the woman, the son and the cop are all black. Does it make sense
for the CCRB to characterize this as an ethnic slur? Would black
officers stop using the phrase if it were? Should such a case be
mediated or facilitated? If so, should the same option be offered to
a white officer who considers himself "the white shadow," who
gets down with the brothers and sisters and uses the same lan-
guage? What kinds of equal protection risks are run?
In case two, note the contrast between the old Board and the
new Board. A young, poor Latino with a criminal record and
convictions for narcotics dies in police custody. Traces of cocaine
are found in his blood. Does the officer have to be questioned? I
have had two answers. Under the old Board: "No. The guy was
obviously a user. We will exonerate you." Under the new Board:
"No. The guy was obviously a victim of police misconduct. We
will substantiate." The Bill Kuntz way: I think you talk to the
police officer to try to find out what happened.
In case three, a young Latino cop has an exemplary record and
no CCRB complaints, with one exception-he cannot stand what
he perceives as favored treatment of Latinas, and he proceeds to
tell them so on every interaction. There is also a white cop with an
exemplary record, with one exception-he is an ardent right-to-
lifer, who lectures women entering abortion clinics that he has been
to protect. Should these cops have cases substantiated against them
or have cases unsubstantiated against them, or should the com-
manders have the good sense to take the Latino cop out of
Williamsburg, Brooklyn, and take the other cop away from abortion
clinic duty? Just switching them would have done wonders for their
respective careers. Some of this stuff is rocket science, but some of
it is not. It was amazing that we [on the Board] had to say to them
[the police department] "just switch them."
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These are the micro-cases-the force, abuse and offensive
language cases-which have historically constituted the core
mission of the CCRB's mandate of both the old and new Boards,
even though we have been defined by the mega-cases to which the
Judge and professor allude.
On a final note, I would be remiss if I failed to address at least
one macro-issue. There is a startling truth in the Mollen Commis-
sion Report on pages 25-50,"' and that is the fact that the link
between police brutality and police corruption can no longer be
denied. In such a world, with the attempt to establish an indepen-
dent police investigation, an auditor has to date been unsuccessful.
Will we see yet another incarnation of the CCRB, one that
embraces and understands the link between police force and
brutality, that seeks to address the issues of corruption as well?
Will we someday have a CCRB taking under its wing corruption
under the rubric of abuse rhetoric? For some, that is a scary
thought.
Fortunately, however, my time is up, and the judge, professor,
and civil libertarian will hopefully give me a passing grade for
having the judgment to spot the issues, and the wisdom to leave it
to the smart folks to come up with the answers.
'9 See THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGA-
TIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE
POLICE DEPARTMENT, COMMISSION REPORT 25-50 (1994) (Hon. Milton Mollen,
Chair) (discussing police brutality and corruption).
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Deborah Small*
Good afternoon. It's been a while since I've been in a law
school environment, and the first thing that hit me is the serious-
ness on everyone's faces when they came into the room. At first,
I chalked it up to the fact that I'm in a law school environment.
Then I thought about the fact that it is appropriate that be so,
because it is a serious topic that we are talking about today.
I want to tell you about how it was when I first came to be on
the Abner Louima case.1 Last Summer I had the good fortune of
being able to travel with a group of African-Americans to South
Africa to attend a conference. While I was there I had the privilege
of being able to attend some of the hearings of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.2 The hearings that I attended were in
* Practicing attorney in New York; former Legislative Director, New York
Civil Liberties Union.
' On August 9, 1997, Louima was arrested by New York City police officers
following a scuffle outside a nightclub in Brooklyn. Dan Barry, Charges of
Brutality: The Overview; Officer Charged in Man's Torture at Station House,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at Al. Louima alleges that, following his arrest,
police officers from the NYPD's 70th precinct attacked him in the station house.
Id. Among Louima's most publicized accusations was that the accused officers
had sodomized him with the wooden handle of a toilet plunger. See David
Kocieniewski, Injured Man Says Brooklyn Officers Tortured Him in Custody,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at BI (describing Abner Louima's allegations of
police brutality while he was in the custody of officers at the 70th Precinct). Five
New York City police officers have been charged by the U.S. Attorney's Office
for the Eastern District of New York for their roles in the alleged assault. Henri
E. Cauvin, Rally for Louima, DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 10, 1998, at 18.
2 The Truth and ReconciliationCommission ("TRC") is a "government body
that has been delving into human-rights abuses of the apartheid era of racial
separation." Dean E. Murphy, U.S. Reportedly Encouraged Chemical Arms in
South Africa, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 1, 1998, at A5. The TRC's efforts were
"intended to foster racial harmony by exposing the crimes committed by both
whites and blacks during the apartheid era." Id. For two and a half years the
TRC held "nationwide hearings on human rights abuses during the apartheid era;
confessions, accusations and testimonies [that were included in a] comprehensive
report." Charlayne Hunter-Gault & Brooke Gladstone, Weekend Edition. South
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Johannesburg, and were specially designed to address issues of the
abuse of women under apartheid.3 The day that I attended the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings, I listened to a
variety of testimony by women from throughout South Africa, but
particularly the area around Johannesburg. One case that was
spoken about still stays with me today. It is somewhat horrific but
I want to share it with people, because there is a point that I want
to make by giving you this story.
This woman talked about having been taken from her home by
South African police officers during the height of the apartheid
struggle, to a police station where she was held for a considerable
amount of time and tortured.4 Part of the torture that she was
subjected to was being tied down to a table and having rodents
inserted into her vaginal area. She spoke about how even today,
years after the fact, she still wakes up, with the feeling of the
clawing, of their claws inside of her body. It is something that she
will never be able to forget. And I remember sitting there and just
thinking how horrible it was and as a woman, hardly being able to
listen and thinking to myself, "Thank God I'm an American
because things like that don't happen there."
I came home a week later and my son came to pick me up at
the airport. As we were driving, I asked him what had been going
on in the city in my absence. He told me about the Louima case.'
This was the Saturday after the case had broken. At this point
Mayor Giuliani and the Police Commissioner6 had done whatever
Africa's Truth Commission Ended its Hearings on Human Rights Violations This
Week (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 1, 1998), available in 1998 WL
6285051 [hereinafter NPR].
' See NPR, supra note 2.
4 See Patricia Chisholm et al., Apartheid: Can the Truth Set a Nation Free?,
MACLEAN'S, Apr. 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8016224 (describing torture
methods used by former South African policeman Paul Erasmus, also known as
"Mr. Dirty Tricks"); see also Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, I J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 47 (1997) (describing torture in South Africa under the F.W. de
Klerk government and subsequent efforts at reconciliation).
' See supra note 1 (discussing the Louima case).
6 The New York City Police Commissioner at the time of the Louima
incident was Howard Safir. THE GREEN BOOK: OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK 257 (1996).
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it was that they did to take the officers out of the precinct.7 They
were still in the investigative stage. But I remember listening to his
[Louima's] account of what had happened, and being appalled
because it just flew in the face of what I believed could and
couldn't happen in this country. I said to myself, "I guess I'm not
as far away from South Africa as I thought." As the events
continued to unfold the thing that struck me most is that torture
happened there, regardless of whether or not the specific officers
that were accused committed a crime.8 We do know that this man
[Louima] was tortured in the precinct. He's not the first person to
be tortured under police custody and I dare say that he won't be
the last.9
I think it is important for us to look at what role torture plays.
The purpose of torture is to exert power, to demonstrate power
over others. I agree with all the other speakers who have spoken
today that the majority of the police officers in New York are not
brutal and would not even think about engaging in the type of
torture that Abner Louima says that he was subjected to. What I do
believe is true, what the New York Civil Liberties Union believes
is true,10 and what has been true for the entire time of my life in
' See City Officials Express Outrage on Police Brutality, N.Y. BEACON,
Aug. 27, 1997, at 5 (describing the filing of a criminal complaint against Officer
Justin A. Volpe of the 70th Precinct); What the Abner Louima Case Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 1997, at Al (criticizing the Giuliani administration's efforts to
investigate the Abner Louima incident).
' See Kocieniewski, supra note 1, at BI (describing how officers allegedly
beat Louima and "shoved the wooden handle of a toilet plunger into his rectum
and then into his mouth").
9 See Dennis Cauchon, Badge Shines a Little Less Bright in Brooklyn, USA
TODAY, Aug. 27, 1997, at 4A (describing alleged acts of police violence prior
to the Louima incident involving officers of the 70th precinct); Bob Herbert,
Editorial, In America: Connect the Dots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1997, section 4,
at 13 (describing several acts of violence by New York City Police officers and
the lack of effort by the Internal Affairs Division of the police department to
improve investigations); Bob Herbert, Editorial, In America: One More Victim,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at A31 (recounting several acts of reported police
brutality in New York City prior to the Louima incident).
'0 See New York Civil Liberties Union, Deflecting Blame (visited Nov. 8,
1998) <http://www.nyclu.org/blamel.html> [hereinafter Deflecting Blame]
(discussing the failure of Mayor Giuliani's Task Force on Police/Community
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living in New York City is that there is a tolerance of police abuse
and torture, particularly when it is inflicted upon people of color.
It is an important part of this conversation, because I believe that
the reason that we have made so little progress is addressing the
issue of police abusive violence is that so often the people who are
victims of police brutality are people of color or people who are
basically considered powerless in the overall scheme of things. I
want to suggest that the real solution to finally addressing this
problem does not lie totally with the Mayor's Office or the NYPD,
with improving police training, with having a residency require-
ment, or with having a special prosecutor." I think all of these are
entirely good ideas that need to be implemented. However, I really
believe that the ultimate solution to addressing this problem lies
with everyone in this room, and everyone else in New York City,
who are, in fact, the employers of the New York Police Depart-
ment.
It's only when we, as citizens and taxpayers, say that we will
not tolerate this type of behavior and excuse it as something that
occurs in isolated incidents that police violence will end. Until we
demonstrate that we are not willing to tolerate police abuses, these
types of incidents will continue to occur.
Last night [April 14, 1998], the news had a short story about a
police action in Washington Heights, New York, as part of an anti-
drug initiative.12 The report stated that police had cordoned off
Relations to improve perceived lawlessness within the NYPD). Mayor Giuliani
formed the Task Force on Police/Community Relations in August 1997 in
response to the charges of police brutality against Abner Louima. Id. The
majority's final report made seventeen recommendations, including the increase
of NYPD academy training from six months to one year, and residency
requirements for police officers. Id. The Task Force refused to recommend the
establishment of a permanent special state prosecutor for police corruption and
brutality that the Dissent from the Task Force Report believed to be crucial. Id.
Id.
2 See Paul Schwartzman, NYPD Takes Back Streets: New In-Your-Face
Strategy Has Drug Dealers on the Run, DAILY NEWS (New York), May 10,
1998, at 20 (describing the Washington Heights crackdown and similar
crackdowns in the Bronx and Queens, and the resulting drop in shootings and
improvement in quality of life for some area residents, as well as the perception
of police harassment by other area residents).
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sections of Washington Heights, closed off the streets and engaged
in an anti-drug crackdown. 3 I am sure that the majority of New
Yorkers who listened to that report thought, "Gee, that's a good
thing; we have a lot of drugs in Washington Heights." People
thought it was good that the police are engaging in activities to get
rid of that problem, but I talked to a lot of people who live in
Washington Heights, particularly young people. One of the things
they have talked about is what it is like, as residents of Washington
Heights, to be subjected periodically to these types of crackdowns,
where their streets are cornered off, where everyone who goes in
and out of buildings on that street is stopped and questioned,
sometimes searched and sometimes detained. For most New
Yorkers that is not something they have to experience on a regular
basis.
I would like to digress for a moment. One of the things that
was interesting about participating in the Mayor's Task Force 4
was that our community relations liaison was going to the Task
Force community meetings. Overwhelmingly, the people who were
in attendance were older people-people my age and older.
Because I am over forty, the chances of being stopped, detained or
harassed by the police are relatively minimal. However, I am also
the parent of a twenty-one year-old who is a prime target for police
harassment.
For example, one day my son came home after having left for
work and I wondered why he was back. He said he had forgotten
his driver's license. I said, "But you don't drive, you don't have a
car." He said, "I cannot go to work without my driver's license
because if the police stop me and ask me for my I.D., and I don't
have it, I could end up in the police station tonight." That is a fact.
I realized then how very similar my life-and my relationship with
my son as a parent around these issues-is to a relationship of a lot
of black mothers in the south in the 1950's, who had to teach their
13 Ild.
"4 In the wake of the Louima incident, Mayor Giuliani created the Task
Force on Police/Community Relations. See Alan Finder, At The Heart of Report
on Police, Some Modest Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at B2
(discussing the Louima incident and subsequent events).
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children how to avoid having negative encounters with white
people that could result in violence.
To me, the problem with police violence is not just limited to
the incidents like the Abner Louima case or the Tony Baez 5 case,
where the cases get a lot of publicity and where, often times, the
criminal justice system at least goes into gear to seek correction for
it. I believe the real problem of police violence lies in the everyday
encounters that minority people have with the police in this city,
where they are disrespected and where they are abused verbally.
Violence is not just limited to just physical violence. There's
also emotional and psychological violence when you live in a
community where you feel that the people who are walking about
with badges and guns are not there to protect you, but to protect
other people from you. That is a psychological violence situation,
when you have young people in a community who believe that they
are perceived as criminal purely because of their race, their age and
their sex. That is a violent situation, and one that leads to violence.
The point that I want to make in all of this is that I wanted to
expand the surroundings of this conversation and not be limited to
the kinds of cases that we are used to hearing about. I also wanted
to provoke people to think a little bit more about their typical
responses to violence and their attitudes about police, because I
agree with the prior panelists, particularly, Judge Mollen and
Professor Chevigny, who attributed a lot of this to our attitudes
about the function of police in our society. 6 Are we using the
police as a tool to deal with social problems that we feel incapable
to deal with otherwise? If so, then that is the wrong instrument.
The police are not trained, not equipped to do that type of job. To
"s On December 22, 1994, Anthony Baez died during an argument with New
York City police officer Francis X. Livoti. Clifford Krauss, Officer is Indicted
in Man's Death During Confrontation in Bronx, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1995, at
B2; Jim Dwyer, Asphyxia, Say Experts: Quiet Nabe, Irate Cop & Ugly Death for
Baez, DAILY NEWS (New York), Sept. 17, 1996, at 8 (describing the Baez
incident in the context of the criminal trial of Livoti on murder charges in
connection with Baez' death. A key point in controversy was whether the "choke
hold" that caused Baez' asphyxiation was excessive force by Livoti).
16 See supra comments of Professor Paul Chevigny, p. 86; Hon. Milton
Mollen, pp. 100-101 (analyzing the public perception of police violence).
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the extent that we are relying on policemen to deal with those types
of problems, you do have an awful lot of tension. I would not want
to have a full-time job where it was my responsibility to deal with
issues of domestic violence, substance abuse, drug selling, and all
types of robbery and petty abuse that goes on in poor communities
on a day-to-day basis. Then, to have that be the scope of my
interaction with people, and to expect to have a good feeling about
those people. In fact, the majority of police work is involved with
just those types of things.
Those people in the Police Department who commit themselves
to having a career actually doing community relations, working the
youth counsel, working with the local merchants, et cetera, don't
get an award for their work. They do not get to be upper-rank
policemen. In fact, they are looked down on by other members of
the Police Department.
I want to suggest that if we really want to do something about
the issue of police violence, we will start dealing with that whole
"Blue Wall of Silence."' 7 I think it is terrible that, even as of this
date, there have only been two or three officers from the precinct
who have come forward to cooperate in the Louima investiga-
tion. 8 While working on the Task Force report we had a number
of philosophical arguments in the office about what constitutes
"7 "The blue wall of silence is an unwritten loyalty oath among police
officers that prohibits a police officer from reporting incriminating information
about a fellow officer. Police organizations impose severe consequences on those
officers who violate the code." Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and
the Inadequacy of Fourth Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting
Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 151, 203 (1994). The
"Blue Wall of Silence" is further characterized as "an unwritten code in many
departments which prohibits disclosing perjury or other misconduct by fellow
officers, or even testifying truthfully if the facts would implicate the conduct of
a fellow officer." Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence"
as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Peijuiy, 59
U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 237 (1998). The Mollen Commission also found a strong
code of silence in the New York Police Department. Id. at 240.
8 New York City police officers Eric Turetzy and Mark Schofield provided
investigators with information on the Louima incident. See Dan Barry, Officers'
Silence Still Thwarting Torture Inquiiy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1997, at A3.
Almost one hundred other officers, however, professed to know nothing. Id.
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police violence. The analogy that I would like to make to illustrate
my viewpoint is this: If you are at a lynching, the people who put
the rope around the person's neck, who tie it around a tree, who
pull it up are clearly guilty of that lynching. But so are the hundred
or so other people who are standing around wearing robes and
hoods and watching, and who don't come forward after the fact to
say who it was that tied the rope around the man's neck. That's the
situation that we have here in New York.
We have thousands of officers who have witnessed police
misconduct, who have witnessed police violence, but who have
been able to absolve themselves of any responsibility and who do
not feel compelled to tell what they know.19 We have public
officials who have excused that behavior,2" and who do not see
that [act] as having the same level of culpability as the officer who
actually used the baton, fired the gun or beat the suspect or the
civilian.
I want to suggest that, while our office and our organization has
advocated and will continue to advocate the types of changes that
Judge Mollen talked about and that we have spoken about in my
dissenting report,2 we especially need to have a residency
requirement. We need to have a police department that is more
" See Bob Herbert, In America: Remaining Blind to Brutality, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1997, at A31. The author states that:
[C]ops who brutalize civilians are for the most part shielded by the
department and protected by the rest of the criminal justice system....
[B]rutal cops are allowed to operate in what amounts to a moral void,
an utterly lawless region in which virtually any kind of violence, even
murderous violence, is tolerated. A cop whose record is spotless will
watch a colleague beat a civilian nearly to death and then swear under
oath that he never saw a thing.
Id.
'0 See Bob Herbert, Editorial, In America: Hear the Blue Wall Crack, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at 6 (stating that "[m]ost cases of brutality are covered
up one way or another. Even now the Mayor and the Police commissioner refuse
to acknowledge the full extent of the problem. They won't even speak candidly
about the so-called blue wall of silence.").
21 Deflecting Blame, supra note 10 (discussing the failure of Mayor
Giuliani's Task Force on Police/Community Relations to improve perceived
lawlessness with the NYPD).
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reflective of the city, and that therefore has a higher number of
women, African-Americans, Latinos, Asians-not just as police
officers, but in supervisory ranks as well. We also must have more
accountability, not just through the Civilian Complaint Review
Board,22 but also by having, when necessary, a special prosecutor
with extra authority to investigate the very difficult cases of police
violence where you have situations like in the Abner Louima
precinct, where the majority of officers will not cooperate. This
change would restore some accountability on the local level.
We should also have the various police counsel on a local level
be in partnership with the police to do monitoring on a regular
basis. Many problems could be avoided just by asking local
residents their perception of the officers that patrol their communi-
ty. We continue to advocate all of those things. But I would like to
say that I think, most importantly, what is necessary is a change in
attitudes on the part of the NYPD, the Mayor and the citizens of
New York.
Our elected officials take the positions that they feel that they
can take. So, to the extent that there has been little action in this
area, it is because we don't have a populace that demands it. One
of the reasons that Los Angeles is further ahead in dealing with this
issue than New York is because Los Angeles had a major civil
disturbance.2 3 The residents of Los Angeles said, "We can't afford
this, not just because of the cost involved in settling the various
court cases involving police violence, but also because we don't
22 See Michelle Boorstein, Police Review Boards Remain Popular: Number
of Civilian Panels Growing, Though Most are Ineffective, Experts Say, FT.
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 3, 1988, at 19 (recognizing that, in general,
civilian review boards do not adequately hold police officers accountable for
their actions).
23 The speaker refers to motorist Rodney King's beating by several Los
Angeles police officers, four of whom were tried and acquitted. Richard A.
Serrano & Tracy Wilkinson, All 4 in King Beating Acquitted: Violence Follows
Verdicts, L.A. TIMES, April 30, 1992 at Al; see also Louis Sahagun & Vicki
Torres, Jittery L.A. Sees Rays of Hope: Few Crimes, No Major Fires are
Reported, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1992, at Al (noting that in the aftermath of the
acquittals of the four police officers, the largest riot in United States history
erupted; there were a total of 44 riot-related deaths and a peacekeeping force of
more than 6,550 arrested a total of 6,720 over four days).
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want to see our city get burnt up around us." There has not been
that commensurate level of outrage and outcry in New York about
the continuing cases of police violence that people hear about on
a regular basis. We have a march. We have a Task Force, we have
a report. We have some recommendations. But, very little has
changed.
This has been continuing in this city since 1845.24 We are
talking about over 150 years of the same cycle, the same behavior.
When the violence first started, it was directed towards Irish and
Jewish immigrants. Now it is directed towards Blacks and Latinos.
But it is the same mentality. It is the same basic circumstances and
it is the same basic causes.
I want to leave you with the thought that you are individually
accountable for making sure that the police are accountable. If you
want to have a police force that is less violent, that is more user-
friendly, that treats every citizen with the type of respect that we
believe that they deserve, then you have to take individual
responsibility Because we fear cases like Abner Louima, don't read
about it in the paper and say "Tisk, tisk, tisk, that's really terrible,"
and then continue to vote for the people that allow these things to
happen and who then do not come out and march and do not take
action. Because, then, you would just be responsible for allowing
that to continue. Thank you.
24 The New York City Police Department was founded in 1845 with 900
initial police officers. New York City Police Department, Who We Are (visited
Nov. 24, 1998) <http://www.ci.nyc.us./html/nypd/html/whoweare/html>.
